INTRODUCTION
If the Rhetoric of Economics is conceived as an alternative approach to the understanding of the workings of the so-called Economic Science then the present paper should not be seen as an essay within the Rhetoric of Economics. I have written in this vein in two occasions though. In 1982 I contributed to the celebrations of Keynes' centenary an avant la lettre rhetorical analysis of his policy ideas mentioning explicitly how their success was due to his clever using of the emerging culture of his days (see…..). In 1985 I wrote a paper, much later published as la Moda en Economia ( ) using McCloskey's (83) and Klamer's (83) ideas in order to clarify the sense in which the conservative recceipees for the crisis were not warranted by the good rhetoric underlying the rational expectations revolution but needed for its acceptance some additional condiments hardly acceptable as good rhetoric but rather related to political power.
The present paper takes a different tack. It is rather a comment on the Rhetoric of Economics, seen now as an alternative metatheory which is concerned with acceptance and rejection of economic theories and which emphasizes values and other rhetorical means beyond objectivity. It is written from the stand point of a practitioner economist who tries to use current theories or models in selected fields in order to clarify what this special brand of metatheory is saying, without any pretensions of constructing a kind of metamethodology. It is the second time I write in this sort of middle ground. In 1998, and in a very sketchy way, I tried to call attention to the fact that the Reflexivity typical of Economics, and other Social Sciences, makes the distinction between Realism and Rhetoric more problematic than usually thought of.
This unpublished (and unfinished) article could be considered as a late follow-up of the debate about Rhetoric in Economics that took place in Economics and_Philosophy in 1988. In this article I tried to confront two papers by Mäki 1 from the point of view of somebody who was aware that, in Economics, reality could be constructed from expectations, something completely unthinkable in physics, say. What I brought to bear on the discussion was standard macrotheory in the contemporary New Classical vein which includes in an essential way information problems. I talked about bubbles in the stock exchange, the Phillips curve, the Lucas critic and sun-spots or self-fulfilling prophecies.
1 I an referring here to Mäki (88) and to Mäki (96) In the present paper I want to contribute to the more recent debate between Mäki and McCloskey in the Journal of Economic Literature (1995) , somehow summarized in a later paper by Mäki ( 99) and followed by a kind of addendum by him forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Issues (see Mäki (996) . I want to reflect upon Mäki's diagnosis of McCloskey and his proposals for her making sense and to do so, once again, from the stand-point of a practitioner economist. But now the economics I want to rely upon is microtheoretical and not completely standard in the sense that it will be influenced by biological and psychological ideas.. As will be seen this essay can then be taken as a second best exercise in an environment exhibiting less than perfect rationality. This combination seems appropriate for the study of Rhetoric and fits rather well the ontological constraint Mäki Calls www (way the world works) 2 In the net section I summarize Mäki's reconstruction diagnosis of McCloskey as well as his proposals to make sense of McCloskey. The reconstruction is clear enough and the diagnosis claims that McCloskey is not an anarchist, not a postmodernist and not a realist. These two operations, reconstruction and diagnosis, together with the 2 Since in these two pieces I use economic theory they can be seen not only as comments on the Rhetoric of Economics but also as articulating an essay within the Economics of Economics which can easily be extended to the Economics of Science in general or to the Economies of Art and Culture in particular.
proposals, will allow me to establish my purpose with some precision. In the third section of the paper, and in order to legitimize anarchism (or "anything goes"), I make use of a paper by Waldman ( 94 ) on natural selection in evolution to conclude that the moral constraints usually imposed on scientific conversation might have no bite, because the emergence of a systematic error makes then indiscernible. In the fourth section I present some psychological experiments reported by Rabin in JEL ( ) which can give some ground for taking seriously confirmatory bias ( an specific kind of systematic error) as a primitive concept, and the I report on its main implication:
overconfidence. In this section and the following one I make extensive use of the recent paper of Rabin and Schrag ( ). In the fifth section I use some of their results on the implications of confirmatory bias ( wrongness and no learning) to suggest that one can be a realist and yet entertain a coherence theory of truth instead of a correspondence theory of truth just because reality might not be reached. In the sixth section I recall some conditions under which confirmatory bias could lead to discount the opinion of elites and to count only on a kind of majority rule when considering problems of aggregation of experts' or scientists' information, therefore legitimizing postmodernism. In the last section I conclude and offer some additional comments. Mäki is a scientific realist (see Mäki 96) and therefore he dislikes a coherence theory of truth , but quite independently of this, and just to make sense of McCloskey's apparently arbitrary claim that Economics is in good shape, he proposes to stitch to a correspondence theory of truth and reserve angels and elites for the coherence theory of justification at most keeping them apart from any theory of truth and from Rhetoric it self. Let us look briefly at each of this proposals .
MÄKI'S RECONSTRUCTION AND DIAGNOSIS OF McCLOSKEY
As far as Rhetoric is concened the proposal implies that anarchism and postmodernism cannot be excluded from Rhetoric something quite natural specially if me recognizes that it will be polish to let the absence of angels or elites to carry the absence of Rhetoric. I will have something to add to this proposal. As for keeping angels and elites away from the theory of truth seems quite obvious since they have nothing to do with truth when one entertains a correspondence theory of truth. Nothing to add here. Finally Mäki proposes that at most elites and angels could be included in the coherence theory of justification. I will comment on that in the signal.
My peruse propose in this paper can now be stated. I want to study the reconstruction , diagnosis and proposals I have just expounded in an environment (allowing second best analysis and bounded rationality) which exhibits confirmatory bias and seems to fit well the undertones of Rhetoric. In this environment I want to make three broad comments. In the first place I want to reinforce Mäki's proposal of admitting anarchism and postmodernism as part of Rhetoric . However this suggestion also makes reasonable a coherence theory of truth even if one is a realist; something that Máki presumable wouldn't tike. In the second place I want to suggest that in the environment studied angels and elites are, surprisingly, compatible with anarchism and postmodernism casting doubts into Mäki's diagnosis of McCloskey. In the third place, the compatibility of anarchism, postmodernism and realism in the environment studied makes the use of angels and elites in the theory of justification something more doubt full than Mäki seems to admit. I will briefly express my doubts about the possibility that elites and angles could make the market of ideas run smoothly.
MORAL CONSTRAINTS (SPRACHETIK AND HERRSCHAFTFREIKEIT)
These two notions imply surely that scientific conversations are honest attempts at persuasion which exclude both lying about findings or personal characteristics and the formation of coalitions to exercise power in matters of justification. However, as we will now see these two traits might not exclude systematic errors when judging the merits of a particular theory or when trying to weigh one theory against another. The important point is that these systematic errors might look as dishonest or mafia-like behavior.
In the sequel Waldman's (94) ideas will be summarized showing that an evolution might lead to an equilibrium in which the above-mentioned systematic error will appear. Let us then assume that at a point in time t of the evolutionary process there are a continuum of scientists of unit mass and a continuum of scientific institutions of unit mass. This is a technical assumption that should not bother as here. Both scientists and institutions are characterized by a pair of parameters δ and
. Now, for a scientist 0 ≥ δ stands for the desutility of effort and, for an institution, it stands for the desutility of effort it inoculates in any of its members. Similarly we take γ to stand for the bias of a scientist in evaluating its own performance and for the self-confidence an institution endows any of its members with. The number and / or relevance of the contributions of scientist i is given by ( )
a function of the effort s(he) chooses to make and of the quality of the institution s(he) belongs to. Where quality is a continuos variable. However the subjective estimation of these contributions is given by ,
where indeed i γ is the itch scientist bias or self-confidence. The utility of this scientist is given by
Given some standard characteristics of the function f, which make effort and quality of institution complementary, it is easy to understand that with any 0 > δ , the effort which maximizes utility is always smaller than the maximum possible effort e .
We now turn to the exploration of natural selection and the We now turn our attention to the evolutionary process. Let us assume that at period t the data are the following. There is a proportion λ of scientists characterized by ( 
We now turn to exploration of natural selection and the corresponding notion of equilibrium. We say that (
. It is very easy to find conditions under ) can be a second best adaptation (Waldman lemma 2) and that this second best adaptation can also be ESS provided 3k (
The very general intuition of these results (the formal proof of which is indeed in Waldman) is rather obvious. There are initial conditions in the form of population proportions in the space of characteristics which are reinforced by the forces of natural selection even when they are not the first best. As has been suggested the first best is
given by a level of effort e < e and by absence of bias, 1 = γ , which occurs when
. As in any theory of second best if 0 ≠ δ the second best solution does not
As far as Mäki's first proposal is concerned the point of the exercise is to suggest that the moral constraints of Sprachetik and Herrschaftfreikeit might not be binding in a 3 Note in passing that 1 > ∧ γ means systematic error. The possibility of such systematicity in committing errors contradicts the underlying logic of the rational expectation hypothesis that is, systematic errors (in forecasting par example) can be detected and yet not to induce any revision. 4 The relationship between second best and evolution is interesting in its elf bus is also related to bounder rationality. Evolution is blind, it proceeds, for instance, ramdon pairings, and not by organizing them in any optimal way. And it is preusly because it proceeds like this that evolution may and generate first best selection. However the solutions it does generate are persistent if they are evolutionary stable (just as the QWERTY key board is persistent. But this persistence does not mean that strategies cannot change in extreme circumstances like uniting two different population of approximately the same size. These very particular way. In the example examined the situation is free of herrschaft because the pairings are random and no coalitions are allowed to form for the mutual promotion of a particular scientific theory or approach. The situation is also such that Sprachetik is the rule since nobody hides its characteristics with some strategic goal in mind.
However some systematic error or overvaluation of own merit might emerge through the forces of natural selection. If it does emerge we encounter a social situation which is infornationally equivalent to a situation in which scientists strategically misrepresent their merits or connive with others to impose certain theories.
Under this informational equivalence is not completely foolish to entertain an anarchistic attitude. Therefore this possibility reinforces Mäki's proposal of admitting anarchism in Rhetoric, not because it is realist to do so but because even if it want's. He situation might look as such and there might be no way of make believe that what is going on is an honest and open discussion.
CONFIRMATORY BIAS AND OVERCONFIDENCE
apparently stable strategies can also change in expectedly when expectation have to be coordinated because there are multiple second but solutions, a case which is quite normal.
That there might be systematic biases in the agents perceptions might be taken as a theoretical curiosity. However psychological experiments reported by Rabin (98) seem to show quite clearly that in fact those biases are present in real life. Among these experiments the ones which seem most congenial to my purpose here are the ones referred to as confirmatory bias , a kind of bias which produces a certain belief perseverance.
Experiment 1 (Lord, Ross and Lepper ). Rabin ( 98 ) show. This is particularly so among "experts who have rich models of the system in question". Rabin continues: "indeed many authors have hypothesized the role of reasoning process itself in exacerbating the confirmatory bias".
This confirmatory bias seem to be specially important under the following condition: (i) ambiguity of the evidence, (ii) abstract character of the situation, (iii) necessity of interpretation of evidence of situation and (iv) previous reasoning. Let us now formalize the consequences of confirmatory bias. In this section we focus attention on how it leads to overconfidence. In the next two sections we will try to understand its eventual consequences for the pursuit of truth (however defined).
At this point we just prepare the stage for further analysis. Let us focus then on a particular agent, a scientist say, and let x be a particular theory. This theory x { } B A, ∈ and x=A means " x is true" and x = B means " x is false". For the moment it is not necessary to specify what kind of theory of truth we stick to. Our scientist has an a priori belief over the set { } B A, which can be written as prob ( x=A) = prob (x =B)=0.5. At each t, t= 1,2,3,……., the scientist receives a signal st , independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), which is correlated with the true state of the world, A or B. This signal
. Since we do not specify whether " true" means "coherent" with other theories or "faithful" to the real world the interpretation of S t can go from the reaction to the presentation of x to an educated audience at a seminar to the result of an experiment specially designed to ascertain the correspondence of the content of x with some trait of reality. But now, the signal st is not perfect and its "correctedness" can be measured by ( and this perception may misinterpret the signal more or less depending on the "severity" of the confirmatory bias. For simplicity let as assume that only those signals which conflict with a priori beliefs are misinterpreted and let us denote by q the probability of misreading a conflicting signal.
At each point in time the scientist updates his a priori beliefs according to the signals perceived. It is not very difficult to establish now a certain relation ship between the "correctness" of the signal , ϑ , and the "severity" of the confirmatory bias , q , at stage t of the updating process. For no doing let 
i.e. the probability that the scientist misreads the evidence at t given that the previous evidence (may be also misread) has led him to entertain the wrong believe, and
i.e. the probability that the scientist reads correctly the evidence at t given that the previous evidence (may be read correctly or may be misread) has led him to entertain the right belief. First impression matter a lot and beliefs cannot be changed by any posterior evidence conflicting with this first impression. We could say that when ever q>0 but 1 q ≠ rationality is not perfect and this justifies my calling this paper an exercise in bounded rationality. θ be the probability of my misreading the signal α when B is the case but I take A to be the case because it is supported by previous evidence. It is given by the probability that the signal is correct , ϑ , times the probability that I misread it because it conflict wilt my previous belief, q , plus the probability of the signal being incorrect, (1-ϑ whit I always believe because it agrees with my previous believes.
* * θ can be interpreted analogously. In any case the groundwork elaborated in this section will yield its fruit in the next two, when confronting the issue of realism and elites.
ON REALISM
If we want' to discuss McCloskey's claim of being a realist, and we want to discuss it in terms of truth theory we should move to a correspondence theory of truth. In this section we continue to make use of Rabin and Schrag (99) results in order to show that confirmatory bias might lead to entertain false theories at least in probabilistic terms and to eliminate possibilities of learning.
Let us first discuses the possibility of our scientist being wrong. As we already know this scientist may think that the probability of X=A is µ >0.5 when in fact it is smaller than µ . S(he) is overconfident but s(he) can be said to be right if the true probability of X=A is greater than 0.5. If in fact this true probability is less than 0.5 s(he) can be said to be wrong. Can s(he) be wrong in this sense?. Yes if ϑ and q are sufficiently close to one. Let us now turn to the possibility of learning . One might hope that, even when having received a certain amount of evidence you are still wrong according to a correspondence theory of truth, the observation of many additional signals will dissipate your ignorance and you will end up learning the truth. Rabin and Schrag have shown that this might not be the case.
Let PW be the probability that although the true state is x=A, the scientist comes to believe irreversibly with near certainty that x = B, starting from any belief. The following fact means that there is a positive probability that this may happen. 
When this is the case we already know that, once the scientist has come to believe x= A, he is more likely to perceive confirmatory evidence in favor of his or her incorrect beliefs. Than to perceive signals which conflict with this incorrect belief.
These two last facts are direct consequences of the confirmatory bias a trait of the psychological personality which could very well be an evolutionary stable second best adaptation under the force of natural selection . Be as it may these results about wrongerss and about learning problematize once more the issue of realism. Now, it is not that expectations might in fact construct reality, something I have discussed in my 1998 already mentioned article, but rather that the correspondence theory of truth is at stake in a certain sense. One can have a realist conception of the world in the sense of believing in a world outside language (as McCloskey confesses she really does: "I'm a realist "answers to Mäki) and one can even, and correspondingly, like to have a correspondence theory of truth (as Mäki advises McCloskey to have) and yet face the impossibility of entertaining such a theory of truth just because the outside world may be completely inaccessible, a possibility that the two results above appear to sustain.
Under these circumstances we might easily say that "correspondence" is an interesting notion that however has to be considered inoperative. Then why should one not held a coherence theory of truth?. For one thing it is accessible precisely because confirmatory bias has no bite against it. One might even use a more forceful argument, namely that coherence is the best strategy one may follow in an open society so as to discover the real underlying world. This argument deserves scrutiny but it has to wait to another occasion. However some additional comments will be offered in the last section. In any case it should be clear that this argument is not immune to confirmatory bias.
ON ELITES
In other to complete my aim in this article I have to show that the social constraints represented by elites might not be binding in scientific conversations. For so doing I continue to explore the consequences of confirmatory bias now on how to aggregate the information provided by experts each of which judges whether x = A or x = B, i.e. whether theory x is true or false (without restricting these notions to any correspondence with the underlying reality). Mäki notices at this respect that
McCloskey puts more strength on the opinions of members of a scientific elite which in his case could be the Chicago type of economist or, more in general, the one belonging to the neoclassical tradition. However, as we will see presently, it can be shown that, under confirmatory bias, it is quite reasonable to pay attention to the majority of scientists or experts without weighing their opinions according to belong-ness to any particular elite.
Just to be more precise, and because we are interested in Rhetoric as metatheory, let us think of a Principal (be it the metatheorist or any scientific policy board) who must collect information regarding some particular theory from a set of scientist who may be considered his Agents. Because these agents are subject to confirmatory bias the optimal contract between Principal and Agents must not only take into account the usual incentive compatible constraint but must also "prevent decisions based on good faith overconfidence " (Rabin and Schrag (99) The problem is how to incintivate the Agent. To be concrete suppose that the Agent has no cost of gathering information and that s(he) is completely risk averse . In this conditions the Principal has to pay the Agent a fixed amount and, however small, if it is positive the agent will gather an infinite number of observations. Therefore we only have too possibilities. Either the Principal pays no incentive and then, as mentioned, TC is selected. Or the Principal pays a certain amount and the agent gather lots of information. In this latter case we now from Fact 3 that the Agent might be wrong even after gathering all the new observations. It has been shown by Rabin and Schrag that the agent, after information gathering, will identify the true sate of the world with probability:
* which is increasing in ϑ and decreasing in q . Therefore the Principal's expected pay-off is The intuition is quite obvious, in any of these two cases the probability of being wrong is very high.
Given this intuition it should also be intuitive that if the Principal has to allocate a given amount of signals he wants to gather among several agents the more Agents the better, since each agent will be less likely to be carried away by his or her confirmatory bias. The net step is to think about how to weigh the information of each agent once the number of agents has been decided but the number of signals gathered by each agent is unknown . Rabin and Scharg (99) 
CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS
This paper has articulated a second best analysis of a situation quite far from perfect rationality . Confirmatory bias can be thought of as a second best adaptation to the forces of natural selection and can also be an evolutionary stable strategy so that it is here to stay as seems to be supported by several psychological experiments. But once confirmatory bias is at work it is quite clear that economic agents in general or scientists in particular do not act as perfectly rational in the sense that they do no mimic the behavior of a Bayesian statistician. Combining second best theory and not perfect rationality is not staple stock in Economics. However it seems appropriate to the field of Rhetoric. Quite intuitively it does not appear to be any room for rhetoric when rationality is perfect and first best is attainable. Persuasion should be automatic and dired in such a world.
This kind of analysis has yielded three main results. First honesty and open, power-free, conversations may not preclude systematic error in appreciation of theories.
Therefore the moral constraint supposedly operating on the opinions of scientists might not be binding in the sense that their opinions might look completely anarchistic.
Second the social constraint might also not binding because each scientist opinion carries the same weight regardless of fame or honor, a very postmodern situation. Third, one can be a supporter of the correspondence theory of truth, one can have no doubts about the existence of an independent underlying real world and yet one has to accept that an honest and informed conversation may lead to the acceptance of false theories.
These three results obtained in a certain environment sustain the three broad comments I advanced before. First, they given Mäki additional reasons to seclude angels and elites from Rhetoric although these reasons also support a coherence theory of truth something presumably Mäki will not like. Second the compatibility of angels and elites with anarchism, postmodernism (and of course realism). Can yield an alternative diagnosis of McCloskey (more anarchism and postmodernism than Mäki would concede ) more attuned to her proclaimed realism. Third the compatibility of anarchism, postmodernism and realism among themselves makes room from wrongnes and absence of learning and these in terms last doubts on the necessity of maintaining angels and elites in the coherence theory of justification.
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These conclusions may appear as sustaining a rather severe semantic pessimism (or at least skepticism) in Economics. With some final comments about this I close this essay. Semantic matters would look even gloomy if we add strategic considerations in relation to the behavior of scientists. My two colleagues Zamora and Garcia-Bermejo have written on this. Zamora (99) has described how consensus might be reached among scientists and how this consensus might be objective in the sense that scientist will not misrepresent opinions but will tell the truth. However, additional considerations of information cascades or rumors might lead to clusters of opinion completely unrelated to truth as correspondence of opinions with underlying reality.
Garcia Bermejo ( 99) on the other hand has been exploring the possibility of implementing in Nash equilibrium some "epistemologically interesting" situation without clearest results. What is indeed needed is a strategy proof mechanism that has as its equilibrium a semantically acceptable situation. However this is easier said than done.
Even if we assume away strategic considerations we have to confront the issue of whether the "market for ideas" might lead to the discovery of truth under confirmatory bias. The point is, however, that oven if the seventy of the problem were nil and even if moral constraints would underlay the market and social constraints would facilitate its functioning, the market for ideas might not work because increasing rectums to scale are very common when ideas are invioled. Furthermore if we took into account strategic behavior incentive compatibility and efficiency would require perfect competition understood as Makowski and Ostroy (99) understand it, that is requiring full appropriation something almost incompatible with the well known in appropriability of ideas. If in addition we include now confirmatory bias it appears quite impossible to rely on the "market" as a way of reaching truth, given wrongness for instance.
In fact strategic behavior and confirmatory bias together would pose serious puzzles. Consider the following. Confirmatory bias might lead to every scientist stideing to its own theory and we might not discover any majority. Since majority is the why way we have to justify our beliefs under confirmatory bias we may wart to penalize nengalenty somehow. But this incentive scheme might generate estrange dynamics In conclusion, one cannot be very optimistic about the possibility that a coherence theory of truth, even including elites and angles, could be a good strategy to attain truth in a correspondence sense. The promising strategy is to study alternative imperfect social decision arrangements en for their relative characteristics in relation to errors of acceptance of take theories or to errors in the rejection of true theories. What I think is worth exploring is the literature on the architecture of imperfect economic systems iniciated by Sah and Stightz (88) under the possibility of confirmatory bias. But this exploration will have to wait to some other occasion.
